Article 1191- Zulueta v. Mariano 111 SCRA 206

JOSE C. ZULUETA vs. HON. HERMINIO MARIANO

No. L-29360. January 30, 1982.*

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

In this action for Mandamus and Prohibition, petitioner seeks to compel respondent Judge to assume appellate, not original, jurisdiction over an Ejectment case appealed from the Municipal Court of Pasig (CC No. 1190 entitled Jose C Zulueta

Respondent Avellana occupied the property from December, 1964, but title remained with petitioner Zulueta.

Upon the allegation that respondent Avellana had failed to comply with the monthly amortizations stipulated in the contract, despite demands to pay and to vacate the premises, and that thereby the contract was converted into one of lease, petitioner, on June 22, 1966, commenced an Ejectment suit against respondent before the Municipal Court of Pasig (CC No. 1190), praying that judgment be rendered ordering respondent 1) to vacate the premises; 2) to pay petitioner the sum of P11,751.30 representing respondent’s balance owing as of May, 1966; 3) to pay petitioner the sum of P630.00 every month after May, 1966, and costs.

Respondent controverted by contending that the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action as it involved the interpretation and/or rescission of the contract; that prior to the execution of the contract to sell, petitioner was already indebted to him in the sum of P31,269.00 representing the cost of two movies respondent made for petitioner and used by the latter in his political campaign in 1964 when petitioner ran for Congressman, as well as the cost of one 16-millimeter projector petitioner borrowed from respondent and which had never been returned, which amounts, according to their understanding, would be applied as down payment for the property and to whatever obligations respondent had with petitioner. The latter strongly denied such an understanding. Respondent’s total counterclaim against petitioner was in the amount of P42,629.99 representing petitioner’s pleaded indebtedness to private respondent, claim for moral damages, and attorney’s fees.

The counterclaim was dismissed by the Municipal Court for being in an amount beyond its jurisdiction. However, as a special defense, private respondent sought to offset the sum of P31,269.00 against his obligations to petitioner.

Deciding the case on May 10, 1967, the Municipal Court found that respondent Avellana had failed to comply with his financial obligations under the contract and ordered him to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to petitioner; to pay petitioner the sum of P21,093.88 representing arrearages as of April, 1967, and P630.00 as monthly rental from and after May, 1967 until delivery of possession of the premises to petitioner. That conclusion was premised on the finding that breach of any of the conditions by private respondent converted the agreement into a lease contract, and upon the following considerations:

“The question involved herein is that of possession, that is, who of the contending parties has the better right to possession of the property in question. The issue in this case being that of possession, the claim of defendant against plaintiff or P31,269.00 indebtedness, has no place as a defense here. It should be the subject-matter of a separate action against plaintiff Jose C. Zulueta. As it is, said indebtedness is only a claim still debatable and controversial and not a final judgment. It is our considered opinion that to admit and to allow such a defense would be tantamount to prejudging the claim on its merits prematurely in favor of defendant. This the court cannot do without violating some rules of law. This is not the proper court and this is not the proper case in which to ventilate the claim”.

Respondent Avellana appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal presided by respondent Judge. Thereat, petitioner moved for execution alleging private respondent’s failure to deposit in advance the monthly rentals, which the latter denied. Respondent Judge held resolution thereof in abeyance.

On February 19, 1968, respondent Avellana filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal alleging that, inasmuch as the defense set up in his Answer was that he had not breached his contract with petitioner, the case necessarily involved the interpretation and/or rescission of the contract and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. Petitioner opposed claiming that the Complaint had set out a clear case of unlawful detainer considering that judicial action for the rescission of the contract was unnecessary due to the automatic rescission clause therein and the fact that petitioner had cancelled said contract so that respondent’s right to remain in the premises had ceased.

On March 21, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Municipal Court, explaining:

“The decision of the lower court declared said Contract to Sell to have been converted into a contract of lease. It is the contention of the defendant that the lower court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case as the same involves the interpretation of contract as to whether or not the same has been converted to lease contract. Although the contract to sell object of this case states that the same may be converted into a lease contract upon the failure of the defendant to pay the amortization of the property in question, there is no showing that before filing this case in the lower court, the plaintiff has exercised or has pursued his right pursuant to the contract which should be the basis of the action in the lower court.”

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge as follows:

“The plaintiff having filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Order dismissing the appeal, the Court, while standing pat on its Order dismissing this case for lack of jurisdiction of the lower court over the subject matter, hereby takes cognizance of the case and will try the case as if it has been filed originally in this Court.

WHEREFORE, let this case be set for pre-trial on July 12, 1968 at 8:30 a.m. with notice to all parties.”

Petitioner then availed of the instant recourse.

Was the action before the Municipal Court of Pasig essentially for detainer and, therefore, within its exclusive original jurisdiction, or one for rescission or annulment of a contract, which should be litigated before a Court of First Instance?

Upon a review of the attendant circumstances, we uphold the ruling of respondent Judge that the Municipal Court of Pasig was bereft of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case filed before it. In his Complaint, petitioner had alleged violation by respondent Avellana of the stipulations of their agreement to sell and thus unilaterally considered the contract rescinded. Respondent Avellana denied any breach on his part and argued that the principal issue was one of interpretation and/or rescission of the contract as well as of set-off. Under those circumstances, proof of violation is a condition precedent to resolution or rescission. It is only when the violation has been established that the contract can be declared resolved or rescinded. Upon such rescission, in turn, hinges a pronouncement that possession of the realty has become unlawful. Thus, the basic issue is not possession but one of rescission or annulment of a contract, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court to hear and determine.

“A violation by a party of any of the stipulations of a contract on agreement to sell real property would entitle the other party to resolved or rescind it. An allegation of such violation in a detainer suit may be proved by competent evidence. And if proved a justice of the peace court might make a finding to that effect, but It certainly cannot declare and hold that the contract is resolved or rescinded. It is beyond its power so to do. And as the illegality of the possession of realty by a party to a contract to sell is premised upon the resolution of the contract, it follows that an allegation and proof of such violation, a condition precedent to such resolution or rescission, to render unlawful the possession of the land or building erected thereon by the party who has violated the contract, cannot be taken cognizance of by a justice of the peace court, x x x”1

True, the contract between the parties provided for extrajudicial rescission. This has legal effect, however, where the other party does not oppose it.2 Where it is objected to, a judicial determination of the issue is still necessary.

“A stipulation entitling one party to take possession of the land and building if the other party violates the contract does not ex proprio vigore confer upon the former the right to take possession thereof if objected to without judicial intervention and determination.”3

But while respondent Judge correctly ruled that the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the case and correctly dismissed the appeal, he erred in assuming original jurisdiction, in the face of the objection interposed by petitioner. Section 11, Rule 40, leaves no room for doubt on this point:

Water Resources Council, not the CFI. (Abe-Abe vs. Manta, 90 SCRA 523.)

Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges, so when a complaint or information is filed before one branch or judge, jurisdiction does not attach to said branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the others. (Mun. of Daet vs. CA., 93 SCRA 503.)

The appeal from the decision of the Sec of Justice mentioned in Sec 47 of the Local Tax Code (PD 231) cannot be construed as to deprive the courts of the jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of a city tax ordinance. (San Miguel Corp. vs. Avelino, 89 SCRA 69.)

Question of nullity of assignment of rights with chattel mortgage is not capable of pecuniary estimation and falls within the jurisdiction of the CFI. (Singson vs. Isabela Sawmill, 88 SCRA 623.)

Failure of respondents-tenants to deposit on time the monthly rentals for the use and occupation of the property gives the lessor the right to execution of decision of the Court of Appeals directing the eviction of the tenants from the leased premises. (Banson vs. Ubay, 94 SCRA 454.)

The only issue in forcible entry and detainer cases is the physical possession of real property—possession de facto and not possession de jure. (Gutierrez vs. Magat, 67 SCRA 262.)

The fact that the lessee continued enjoyment of premises for more than 15 days did not amount to an implied renewal of the lease where notice to vacate had previously been given. (Gamboa’s Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 131.)

In ejectment cases, the defendant may not divest the inferior court of its jurisdiction by merely claiming ownership of the property involved. (Dehesa vs. Macalalag, 81 SCRA 543.)

Presidential Decree No. 20 is applicable to leases for indefinite period, and to prior and existing leases. (Gutierres vs. Cantada, 90 SCRA 1.)

Supreme Court will nip in the bad and dilatory move to forestall execution of judgment in ejectment cases. (Catelang vs. Medina, 91 SCRA 403.) Zulueta vs. Mariano, 111 SCRA 206, No. L-29360 January 30, 1982

FACTS:

Petitioner seeks to compel respondent Judge to assume appellate, not original, jurisdiction over an ejectment case appealed from the Municipal Court of Pasig.

Respondent from the ejectment case filed by Zulueta contended that the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action as it involved the interpretation and/or rescission of the contract; that prior to the execution of the contract to sell the petitioner is indebted to him in the sum of P42,629.99 representing petitioner’s pleaded indebtedness to private respondent, claim for moral damages and attorney’s fees.

The counterclaim was dismissed by the Municipal Court for being in an amount beyond its jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rescission filed by petitioner is valid.

RULING:

Proof of violation is a condition precedent to resolution or rescission. It is only when the violation has been established that the contract can be declared resolved or rescinded. A stipulation entitling one party to take possession of the land and building if the other party violates the contract does not ex propio vigour confer upon the former the right to take possession thereof if objected to without judicial intervention and determination.